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TURNING OVER A NEW SPROUT: PROMOTING
AGRICULTURAL HEALTH BY FOSTERING THE
COEXISTENCE OF ORGANIC AND GENETICALLY
MODIFIED CROPS IN THE WAKE OF MONSANTO CO. V.
GEERTSON SEED FARMS AND THE DEREGULATION OF
MODIFIED ALFALFA
ABSTRACT
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the
agricultural health of the United States requires the concurrent feasibility, or
coexistence, of organic crops and genetically modified crops. Both types of
crops offer separate environmental, economic, and health benefits. Modified
crops, or crops infused with beneficial genes to increase yield or decrease the
need for chemical applications, are ubiquitous in U.S. farming. Similarly,
organic crops, or crops grown without modified genes, are gaining popularity.
Unfortunately, the coexistence of organic and modified crops is threatened by
the phenomenon of gene flow. Damaging gene flow occurs when modified
crops spread their genes and contaminate the genes of nonmodified crops. This
contamination threatens the organic status and marketability of organic crops
and can thus cause economic damage to organic programs. The current legal
and regulatory system is unable to control contamination and thus cannot
ensure the vitality of organic-farming operations. To fulfill coexistence goals
for the agricultural health of the nation, domestic farm programs must ensure
the continued viability of organic farming.
The current regulatory system is unable to protect organic farms from the
risks of contamination, and its inability deters and undermines organic
farming. Recent deregulation decisions confirm this inability. Similarly, recent
cases demonstrate that the technical litigation stemming from contamination
confuses general courts and leads to inadequate remedies. This Comment
argues that the regulatory and adjudicatory systems must protect organic
farms from contamination to ensure their economic viability. When organic
programs are economically viable, organic farms can beneficially coexist with
modified-crop farms.
This Comment offers two possible solutions to the current regimes’
inability to foster coexistence. The Comment contends that changes in agency
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policy could better encompass the economic interests of organic programs and
therefore encourage coexistence. However, limits on an agency’s ability to
change policy hinder the efficacy of this solution. This Comment argues that a
revised statutory framework is required to protect organic crops from the
damaging genetic drift associated with widespread genetically modified crops.
The revised framework requires the USDA to consider the economic impacts of
contamination when deregulating modified crops. The revision also mandates
agency adjudication for contamination disputes to prevent general courts from
handing down inadequate remedies. The revisions will ensure the continued
viability of organic farms, foster coexistence, and secure the agricultural
health of the nation.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States enjoys a rich tradition of agricultural prosperity. The
country led the world in the development of genetically modified (GM) crops
and continues to be a world leader in GM-food production.1 The domestic
planting of GM crops grew at an unprecedented rate from 1996 through 2005.2
Today, over 80% of the country’s corn, cotton, and soybeans contain
genetically engineered genes.3 Modified crops offer benefits, such as increased
yields, decreased labor costs, and decreased chemical applications.4 The
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) advocates GM-crop research
because the crops may help solve potential “issues related to global food
security, energy security, and climate change.”5
Like GM-crop farming, organic farming is a growing industry.6 Organic
crops are crops grown without the aid of genetic alterations, pesticides, or
herbicides.7 Organic crops tout benefits, such as the absence of food additives,
the absence of pesticides and herbicides, and increased sustainability.8 Organic
crops can also offer an absence of genetically altered elements and resistance
to harm stemming from monocropping, or the widespread use of a single

1 See Linda Beebe, In re StarLink Corn: The Link Between Genetically Damaged Crops and an
Inadequate Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 511, 535
(2004) (citing George E.C. York, Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal
Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 426–27 (2001)); Karinne Ludlow &
Stuart J. Smyth, The Quandary of Agricultural Biotechnology, Pure Economic Loss, and Non-Adopters:
Comparing Australia, Canada, and the United States, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 7, 35 (2011).
2 CLIVE JAMES, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, BRIEF 35: GLOBAL
STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2006, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.isaaa.org/
resources/publications/briefs/35/download/isaaa-brief-35-2006.pdf.
3 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2010).
4 Id. at 3–14.
5 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2015, at 23 (2010), available at http://www.ocfo.
usda.gov/usdasp/sp2010/sp2010.pdf.
6 Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and Environmental
Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 14–15 (2011); Organic Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON.
RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Organic/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2009).
7 See Margaret Rosso Grossman, The Coexistence of GM and Other Crops in the European Union, 16
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 324, 324 (2007); Sara N. Pasquinelli, One False Move: The History of Organic
Agriculture and Consequences of Non-Compliance with the Governing Laws and Regulations, 3 GOLDEN
GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 368 (2010) (discussing the historic definition of organic).
8 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 360–61 (citing Minou Yussefi, Organic Farming Worldwide 2006:
Overview and Main Statistics, in THE WORLD OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS & EMERGING TRENDS
2006, at 23, 23 (Helga Willer & Minou Yussefi eds., 2006)).

KIEFER GALLEYS4

2012]

8/20/2012 8:13 AM

TURNING OVER A NEW SPROUT

1245

variety.9 The USDA suggests that farmers are changing to organic-crop
production at an increasing rate to “lower input costs, conserve nonrenewable
resources, capture high-value markets, and boost farm income.”10
Because of possible risks associated with GM crops, the interest of organicfarming operations in maintaining the organic status of their crops, and the
desire to protect the overall stability of the agricultural sector, Congress has
indicated its continued support for organic farming and the USDA has
specifically announced its intention to foster coexistence between GM and
organic crops.11 The USDA’s strategic plan and recent legislation emphasize
the federal government’s desire to support organic programs. The USDA’s
2010–2015 strategic plan notes that maintaining access to organic markets is a
component of ensuring the financial stability of American farms.12 Indeed, the
strategic plan seeks to increase the number of organic-farming operations by
approximately 25% by the end of 2015.13 Similarly, the Organic Foods
Production Act’s stated purpose is “to facilitate interstate commerce
in . . . food that is organically produced.”14 The Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill) provides specific and ongoing incentives
for farmers to engage in organic-crop production.15 These legislative
statements and initiatives indicate a congressional desire to foster organic-crop
programs alongside GM-crop programs.

9 See Keith Aoki, Seeds of Dispute: Intellectual-Property Rights and Agricultural Biodiversity, 3
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 124 (2009) (citing CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD,
POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 47 (1990)).
10 Organic Production: Documentation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.ers.
usda.gov/data-products/organic-production/documentation.aspx (last updated July 5, 2012).
11 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack, Sec’y of Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Stakeholders (Dec. 2010),
available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/GE_Alfalfa-to_stakeholders-2010Dec.pdf (“[W]e at the USDA
are striving to lead an effort to forge a new paradigm based on coexistence and cooperation. If successful, this
effort can ensure that all forms of agriculture thrive so that food can remain abundant, affordable, and safe.”).
12 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 5, at 9.
13 Id. at 10 (noting the baseline of 16,564 organic farms in 2009 and the target of 20,655 organic farms in
2015).
14 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXI, § 2102(3), 104 Stat. 3935, 3935
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6501(3) (2006)).
15 The 2008 Farm Bill created incentives within the Environmental Quality Incentives Program for
famers to assist producers in changing to conservation-based organic-production practices. Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (codified in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.). The 2008 Farm Bill further charges the Secretary of Agriculture to develop “programs that meet
specific needs of producers involved with organic” crop production. Id. sec. 2706, § 1242(i)(2)(B)(i), 122 Stat.
at 1077. The 2008 Farm Bill also increases funding to the National Organic Program for each year through
2012. See id. sec. 10303, § 2123(b), 122 Stat. at 1347.
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Unfortunately, there are barriers to the successful coexistence of organic
and GM crops. Gene flow, or the spread of genetic materials across plant
populations, can contaminate organic crops, causing them to absorb GM genes
and lose their organic status.16 This loss of status can cause considerable
economic harm to organic programs that may no longer be able to sell organic
crops.17 Contamination occurs when genetic data is spread from one crop to
another by various means, including wind, insect activity, or human
intervention.18 Contamination of organic crops through gene flow is the
primary obstacle to the successful coexistence of GM and organic crops.
There is no legal framework directly addressing contamination resulting
from gene flow. Responding to the USDA’s promotion of coexistence
strategies to promote agricultural health, the American Farm Bureau
Association implicitly stated that the current legal and regulatory systems are
unable to prevent contamination and foster beneficial coexistence.19 The
existing federal system governing the deregulation of GM crops spreads
responsibility across the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), and the USDA.20 This framework presumes
that GM crops are beneficial.21 The USDA, through the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), holds the most power over possible
contamination through its responsibility to regulate GM crops as pests under
the Plant Protection Act.22 However, APHIS’s statutory directives only require
it to rely on “sound science” in decisions concerning agricultural products.23
The agency routinely grants deregulation permits based on general

16 See Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations in the Crop, Forestry, Animal and Fishery Sectors,
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/biotech/C7doc.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012)
[hereinafter Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations].
17 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco,
27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 593, 623 (2003).
18 See Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations, supra note 16.
19 Letter from Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n et al. to John P. Holdren, Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy,
Exec. Office of the President (Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://www.naturalnews.com/files/GMO_science_
letter.pdf.
20 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June 26,
1986) (laying out agency responsibility).
21 The language of the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated
Framework) promoted biotechnology and noted that GM crops were not expected to pose any new risks. Id. at
23,339.
22 Pub. L. No. 106-224, tit. IV, 114 Stat. 438 (2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786
(2006)); 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2) n.1 (2011).
23 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7754.
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extrapolations from field tests and without fully considering genetic drift.24
Further, APHIS presumes GM crops are substantially equivalent to non-GM
crops.25 Thus, APHIS, and therefore the overall regulatory system, does not
protect organic-farm systems from contamination and does not support the
USDA’s goals of coexistence.
The courts are similarly unable to adequately protect coexistence ideals.
Frequent technical litigation in the form of patent infringement suits, tort suits,
or regulatory challenges confuses general courts and leads to unsatisfying
remedies. The USDA has noted that conflict between GM and non-GM crops,
like organic crops, may lead to frequent litigation where the courts ultimately
decide “who gets to farm.”26 GM alfalfa was among the crops regulated by
APHIS when Monsanto petitioned for deregulation stating that its GM alfalfa
should not be considered a pest risk.27 APHIS granted Monsanto’s petition in
full and allowed partial deregulation,28 and then Geertson Seed Farms and
other organic groups brought suit against the USDA. The ensuing litigation,
which reached the Supreme Court, ultimately led to the deregulation of
alfalfa.29 More recently, APHIS chose to deregulate GM sugar beets in
violation of a court order requiring the agency to undertake further
environmental assessment.30 These deregulations demonstrate that the courts
are unable to foster coexistence.
The recent disputes over the deregulation and subsequent planting of GM
alfalfa and GM sugar beets have highlighted the growing conflict between GM
and organic crops. Organic producers argued that the deregulated crops would
harm their interests in maintaining organic farms, but GM producers had
satisfied the regulatory requirements for deregulation.31 Both groups have
legitimate claims, and the problems for coexistence reside in the legal and
regulatory framework governing the farming practices.

24 Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating Genetically Modified
Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 412 (2007).
25 See id.
26 Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11.
27 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010).
28 See Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability Determination of Nonregulated
Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,917,
36,917–19 (June 27, 2005) (granting deregulation).
29 Andrew Pollack, U.S. Approves Genetically Modified Alfalfa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at B1.
30 Andrew Pollack, U.S. Says Farmers May Grow Engineered Sugar Beets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011, at
B3.
31 Pollack, supra note 29; Pollack, supra note 30.
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This Comment seeks to explore the current regulatory and legal structures
governing GM crops and contamination, and demonstrate how the system does
not foster the coexistence of GM and organic crops. Part I discusses the growth
of organic- and GM-farming practices. Part I also illustrates how
contamination conflicts with the goal of coexistence. Part II explains the
current legal issues relating to coexistence. The discussion emphasizes the role
of the existing regulatory framework, particularly APHIS’s role under the Plant
Protection Act. Part II also illustrates the failures of the current legal and
regulatory regime in controlling contamination and protecting the economic
feasibility of organic farming. Part III explores two court decisions: Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms and a recent case applying Monsanto, Center for
Food Safety v. Vilsack. These cases highlight the weaknesses in the federal
regulatory program and the inability of the courts to provide adequate
remedies. Part IV proposes possible solutions to protect the economic viability
of organic programs and therefore foster coexistence. Part IV also addresses
the feasibility and costs of the proposed solutions.
I. GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS AND ORGANIC CROPS
The current regulatory system is unable to ensure the beneficial coexistence
of GM and organic crops. Similarly, the courts are unable to support
coexistence. It is necessary to understand the benefits of both organic crops
and GM crops, and the problems of contamination, before exploring the
failures in the legal framework. This Part introduces (1) GM-crop farming, (2)
organic-crop farming, (3) the goal of coexistence, and (4) the obstacle of
genetic contamination in achieving coexistence.
A. Genetically-Modified-Crop Farming in U.S. Agriculture
GM crops emerged in U.S. farming in 199632 and were quickly adopted
throughout the agricultural sector.33 Engineered crops are typically infused
either with herbicide-resistant genes, pest-resistant genes, or both.34 Farmers
have embraced herbicide-resistant GM soybean and cotton to the greatest

32

Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERVICE,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ (last updated July 12, 2012).
33 See JAMES, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that the period from 1996–2005 had “unprecedented” adoption
rates of biotech crops by U.S. farmers).
34 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 3, at 30. Some crops are also infused
with virus-resistant genes. Id. at 29–30.
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extent but have also extensively planted GM cotton and corn.35 In 2009, based
on acreage, more than 80% of the corn, cotton, and soybeans grown in the
United States contained genetically engineered genes.36 The United States
produces approximately half of the world’s biotech crops.37
This widespread adoption of GM crops (extending well beyond cotton,
soybeans, and corn) has led to undisputed benefits, such as increased yields,
decreased labor in weed and pest management, and decreased chemical
applications.38 Additionally, GM crops offer environmental benefits in the
form of reduced greenhouse gases.39 GM crops also have the potential to
produce pharmaceutical materials.40
The United States has largely encouraged the domestic production and
planting of GM crops. To incentivize the development of GM crops, the
United States extends patent protection to modified crops.41 GM producers
develop and sell seeds that sprout engineered crops.42 The patents on these
seeds trump farmers’ common law rights to replant seeds from a prior
harvest.43 These patents have led to tremendous growth in the United States’
GM-crop industry44 and helped the United States become a world leader in the
production of GM crops.45 The USDA continues to advocate GM-crop
research, noting that the technology also “address[es] issues related to global
food security, energy security, and climate change.”46

35

Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S., supra note 32.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 3, at 1.
37 Alison Peck, Leveling the Playing Field in GMO Risk Assessment: Importers, Exporters and the Limits
of Science, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 241, 265 (2010).
38 See Andrew Pollack, Study Finds Benefits in Genetically Modified Crops but Warns of Overuse, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at B3.
39 See Drew L. Kershen, Sustainable Intensive Agriculture: High Technology and Environmental
Benefits, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 424, 429 (2007) (summarizing and citing numerous studies establishing
environmental benefits from biotech farming).
40 Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming F(ears) of Corn: Public Health and Biopharming, 30 AM. J.L. &
MED. 371, 372 (2004).
41 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 89; Benjamin Ikuta, Genetically Modified Plants, Patents, and Terminator
Technology: The Destruction of the Tradition of Seed Saving, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 731, 739 (2009); see also
discussion infra Part II.A.
42 See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 739.
43 See id. at 739–40 (discussing the reduction in a farmer’s common law right to save seeds).
44 See id. (noting that use of herbicide-resistant soybeans rose from 17% of total soybean acreage to over
70% from 1997 to 2006).
45 See Peck, supra note 37, at 244–45 (noting the United States’ prominent position in producing and
exporting GM organisms).
46 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 5, at 23.
36
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Despite the benefits of GM crops, they have not been unanimously
adopted. A small number of countries in the European Union have adopted
certain GM crops, but the approval process for such adoption is notably
“laborious.”47 Recent studies in the United States indicate that the benefits of
GM crops may come with significant drawbacks, especially in the form of
herbicide-resistant weeds.48 Additionally, excessive monocropping of GM
crops can lead to potential drawbacks.49 Monocropping, or monoculture,
describes the homogenous planting of a single genetic strain of a crop.50 A
widespread homogenous crop is more susceptible to disease, weeds, and pests
because a single virus or infection capable of hurting the particular strain can
damage the entire crop.51 Diversity within a type of crop prevents a single
epidemic from destroying an entire harvest.52
B. Organic-Crop Farming in U.S. Agriculture
The establishment of GM crops has coincided with the growth of organicfarming practices in the United States.53 In 2006, over 623,000 farms in the
United States grew organic crops.54 The organic-product industry is predicted
to generate over $50 billion in revenues in 2025 and expected to continue to
grow at a rate of 18% to 20% annually.55 The growing popularity of organic
food in the United States is exemplified by First Lady Michelle Obama’s
organic garden on the White House lawn.56

47 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, In the Fields of Italy, a Conflict over Corn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at A4
(noting that there are only two GM crops that have gained approval throughout Europe). There is also
controversy in developing countries where leaders refuse to adopt GM crops despite widespread hunger in
their nations. See, e.g., Famine and the GM Debate, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2002, 9:58 AM), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/2459903.stm.
48 See Andrew Pollack, Monsanto’s Fortunes Turn Sour, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B1 (noting the
emergence of Roundup-resistance genes after wide use of the herbicide).
49 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 124 (“Genetic engineering in the context of commercial crops necessarily
entails decreased genetic diversity. Because it is essential that GE crops have a uniform genetic structure,
genetic engineering encourages monoculture.”).
50 Id.
51 Id. (citing FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 9, at 47).
52 Id. (citing FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 9, at 46–47).
53 See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Is a Food Revolution Now in Season?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at BU1.
54 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 360–61 (citing Yussefi, supra note 8, at 23).
55 Pasquinelli, supra note 7, at 366.
56 Martin, supra note 53; see also Marian Burros, Obamas to Plant Vegetable Garden at White House,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A1.
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Organic products are generally defined as products derived from crops
grown without the aid of pesticides, herbicides, or genetic modifications.57
Although the USDA defines organic food for domestic-labeling purposes, its
definition is not as strict, in terms of permissible levels of chemicals or
modified genes, as in other organic markets, particularly international
markets.58 Among the benefits attributed to organic products is the absence of
genetically altered elements and reduced environmental harm incurred from
broad pesticide application.59 Organic varieties also entail increased diversity
to prevent the risks associated with monocropping.60 As noted, the USDA
believes farmers change to organic-crop production “to lower input costs,
conserve nonrenewable resources, capture high-value markets, and boost farm
income.”61
C. The Beneficial Coexistence of Modified and Organic Crops
The benefits associated with both GM crops and organic crops demonstrate
that the agricultural health of the United States requires coexistence between
the two practices.62 The Secretary of Agriculture recognized this benefit and
announced the USDA’s intention to foster coexistence in December 2010.63
Similarly, the 2008 Farm Bill included provisions indicating a congressional
desire to ensure continued organic farming in the United States.64 Excessive
GM farming is susceptible to the risks of monocropping. Organic farming is
not susceptible to the risks of monocropping but does not entail the increased
yields or harm resistance of GM crops. Thus, American farming will benefit
from enhanced food security resulting from successful coexistence.65
Unfortunately, coexistence is difficult because genetic drift can cause GM

57

See Grossman, supra note 7, at 324; Pasquinelli, supra note 7, at 368 (discussing the historic definition
of organic and the origins of the modern organic-agriculture movement).
58 See William S. Eubanks II, The Sustainable Farm Bill: A Proposal for Permanent Environmental
Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10493, 10507–08 (2009).
59 See Martin, supra note 53.
60 Aoki, supra note 9, at 124.
61 U.S. Organic Farming, supra note 10.
62 See A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies, the Common Law of Biotechnology and Economic
Liability Risks, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 115, 118–19 (2008) (discussing the benefits of coexistence).
63 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11.
64 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
65 See Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming,
and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 963 (2010) (noting that the historical aims
of food security are fading to special interests).
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crops to contaminate organic crops.66 When organic crops are contaminated,
the crops can lose organic status in their desired market, causing substantial
economic losses to the organic crop producers.67
D. Contamination and Its Frustration of Coexistence
Gene flow, or the spread of genetic materials across plant populations, can
contaminate organic crops by causing them to absorb GM genes and lose their
organic status.68 This loss of status can cause considerable economic harm to
organic programs.69 Contamination results from genetic exposure through
cross-pollination, unclean harvesting or storage practices, or improper handling
outside the farm.70 While the USDA often mandates defined boundaries to
prevent cross-pollination,71 such boundaries do not prevent contamination
either because of illegal plantings or insufficient boundary distances.72
Although some contamination is inevitable,73 the current legal structure is
unable to establish a program that can consistently control contamination and
support coexistence.74 Successful coexistence requires the ongoing economic
feasibility of organic crops, and contamination threatens such feasibility.
Coexistence troubles were before the USDA when, in 2004, it granted
deregulation and then litigated its decision to the Supreme Court.75 The USDA
has now deregulated GM alfalfa despite continuing protests of its potential to
contaminate.76 The ultimate deregulation of GM alfalfa77 is indicative of the
weaknesses of the current framework in fostering coexistence.

66 Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for GMO Accountability, 21 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 38 (2008).
67 Stephanie M. Bernhardt, High Plains Drifting: Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual Property
Implications of the GMO Revolution, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9 (2005). Farmers are unable to insure
themselves against the risk of genetic drift. See Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and
Ownership of Genetically Modified Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 620–21 (2004).
68 See Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations, supra note 16.
69 Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 9.
70 Peck, supra note 66, at 43.
71 See 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(c) (2011) (imposing crop-distance boundaries upon deregulation).
72 Peck, supra note 66, at 47.
73 Id. at 45.
74 See Schneider, supra note 65, at 958 (“[T]he contamination of non-genetically engineered crops
through cross pollination represents a significant problem that remains unresolved.”).
75 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010) (discussing APHIS’s decision to
deregulate alfalfa).
76 See Pollack, supra note 29.
77 Id.
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II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK AND ITS FAILURES
The current legal structure governing coexistence efforts includes (1) patent
protections for GM crops; (2) state and local legal remedies, including tort
suits, aiding those harmed by contamination; and (3) a regulatory framework
governing the release, or deregulation, of GM crops. GM-crop producers can
obtain patents for their products under the Plant Patent Act of 1930, the Plant
Variety Protection Act of 1970, and other utility-patent provisions.78 Producers
of patented seed varieties may enforce these patents even in situations where
alleged infringers obtained the patented genes via genetic drift.79 Conversely,
farmers have brought suit against GM-crop growers under various tort theories
for damage caused by genetic drift.80 The litigation stemming from
contamination (including patent and tort suits) imposes unnecessary costs on
U.S. agriculture and may deter organic farming. The Secretary of Agriculture
identified consistent litigation as a hurdle for coexistence.81 He has called for a
“better way” to promote coexistence than through the courts.82
Outside the courts, the release of GM crops is governed by the patchwork
regulatory system established by the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework).83 While patent protections for GM
crops and tort protection for organic farmers offer some protection and relief,
the failures of the regulatory system prevent the beneficial coexistence of GM
crops and organic crops. Specifically, the Coordinated Framework is unable to
satisfactorily account for the risk of contamination under its statutory
directives. This part discusses (1) GM-crop patent protection, (2) tort and local
remedies, and (3) the Coordinated Framework.
A. Patent Protection for Genetically Modified Crops
A series of patent acts and Supreme Court cases provides incentives for
GM producers to develop GM crops.84 The Plant Patent Act of 1930 granted
patents to the developers of asexually reproducing plants.85 As private-brand
78

See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 734–39 (discussing the development of patent protections for GM crops).
See Drew L. Kershen, Of Straying Crops and Patent Rights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575, 578 (2003)
(reviewing bases of potential infringement claims).
80 See McEowen, supra note 67, at 618–25 (reviewing potential tort claims).
81 Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11.
82 Id.
83 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986).
84 See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 734–39.
85 Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2006)).
79
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seeds continued to gain market share, Congress passed the 1970 Plant Variety
Protection Act86 (PVPA), extending patent protection to most commercial
crops.87 These legislative protections, combined with Supreme Court decisions
favoring biotechnology research,88 led to the consolidation of large seed
companies, particularly Monsanto and DuPont.89 Monsanto recently acquired
“terminator technology” to ensure that farmers who buy GM seeds can only
use those seeds for a single harvest.90
These patent protections are incapable of fully resolving the issue of
genetic drift from modified crops to organic crops.91 While GM producers risk
losing patented products to noncustomer farmers, traditional farmers risk
liability when patented-crop genes drift onto their farms.92 Indeed, as of 2005,
Monsanto had filed over one hundred infringement suits against noncustomer
farmers.93 By 2010, the company won fifty-seven judgments and recovered
over $20 million from patent suits.94 It frequently wins its patent infringement
claims.95 While Monsanto offers to remove patented seeds upon notification by
the affected farmer, organic farms risk losing crops in the removal process.96
Additionally, organic operations may be unaware of contamination until crops
are harvested.97 Recent cases demonstrate that non-GM farmers can be liable

86

Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582).
Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, Trade, and the
Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 165 (2005).
88 See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (extending utility
patents to modified seeds and holding that the Plant Patent Act and PVPA cannot limit utility patents);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (interpreting the Plant Patent Act and PVPA broadly, and
allowing patents to be issued based on human effort); see also Stein, supra note 87, at 166–68 (describing
Supreme Court cases as encouraging the development of the agribusiness industry).
89 Stein, supra note 87, at 164, 167. “[T]he Justice Department is investigating Monsanto for possible
antitrust violations.” Pollack, supra note 48.
90 See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 739. The “terminator technology” and the extension of utility-patent
protection to modified seeds effectively eliminate the common law right of farmers to replant seeds purchased
in a prior season. Id.
91 See Kershen, supra note 79, at 601 (proposing applying the law of stray animals to fix problems with
patent rights and genetic drift).
92 Id. at 578.
93 Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 8.
94 Amanda L. Kool, Halting Pig in the Parlor Patents: Nuisance Law as a Tool to Redress Crop
Contamination, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 453, 468 (2010).
95 See Gregory N. Mandel, The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication, 23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 83, 102 (2006).
96 See Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 9 (noting the risk of removal).
97 See id. at 8 (explaining that an organic farmer may have to spray pesticide to determine if a potentially
contaminated crop is resistant to the pesticide).
87
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for the inadvertent presence of GM seeds in their crops, even when
neighboring farms utilize the patented crops.98
The threat of liability from infringement suits or lost profits from crop
removals may be enough to deter farmers from growing organically.99
Similarly, GM producers must invest resources in monitoring and enforcing
their patents.100 Neither GM producers nor organic farmers benefit from
lawsuits stemming from the patent framework. The patent system and the
ensuing litigation, often stemming from inadvertent contamination, impose
costs on both GM producers and organic-farming interests, and frustrate
coexistence.
B. State and Local Efforts to Promote Coexistence
State and local efforts at controlling contamination, including tort suits
from non-GM farmers, offer some support to coexistence aims. Organicfarming interests can seek relief when their interests are injured by
contamination under the traditional tort theories of trespass, nuisance, or
negligence.101 While tort suits on behalf of organic programs may earn them
some relief, these options are insufficient to protect the goals of coexistence in
U.S. farming. Generally, farmers cannot recover under tort law for purely
economic loss.102 Similarly, organic farmers may not be able to prove damages
when contaminated crops still meet the USDA definition of organic, despite
stricter definitions in foreign markets.103 Also, organic farmers bringing suit
for loss from contamination face countersuits for patent infringement.104
Farmers who bring specific tort actions face problems in establishing causality
or a duty of care.105 Additionally, local efforts at protecting organic-farming

98

See, e.g., Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.) (imposing liability on a farmer
when five neighboring farmers grew Monsanto GM canola and 40% of Canadian farmers used Monsanto
canola).
99 Pasquinelli, supra note 7, at 380.
100 See Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 8 (noting that Monsanto has filed over one hundred suits in the United
States for patent infringement).
101 See McEowen, supra note 67, at 618–25 (discussing potential tort actions for non-GM farmers).
Farmers have been wholly unsuccessful in seeking damages under strict liability theories. Id. at 626.
102 See id. at 622.
103 See Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food Regulations, 13
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 429 (2005) (discussing labeling and noting that USDA-organic status tolerates the
presence of some modified genes).
104 McEowen, supra note 67, at 620.
105 Id. at 618–25.
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practices may be frustrated by state and federal preemption.106 This section
discusses (1) trespass, (2) nuisance, (3) negligence, and (4) state and local
legislation regarding coexistence.
1. Trespass
Organic-farming interests can sue under trespass alleging that drifting
modified genes interfere with their ownership of land.107 Trespass is an
unauthorized intrusion on a person’s land that interferes with that person’s
ownership of the land.108 Organic farmers tend to seek negligent trespass
because intentional trespass is difficult to prove in the context of
contamination, which may occur without intentional human interference.109
Farmers able to prove invasion face countersuits in terms of patent
infringements.110 Nevertheless, trespass is probably the most promising tort
action available to those injured by genetic drift.
2. Nuisance
Organic programs can also allege that drifting modified genes interfere
with the reasonable use of their land.111 A nuisance, specifically a private
nuisance, “is an invasion of an individual’s interest in the reasonable use and
enjoyment of . . . her land.”112 Proving that genetic drift is a nuisance requires
proving that the planting of nearby GM crops was unreasonable.113 Because of
the widespread use of GM crops and the federal imprimatur of GM planting
(assuming deregulation), organic programs may have difficulty proving that
the planting of GM crops was unreasonable.114 Further, the widespread use of
GM crops would make identifying the culprit of unreasonable behavior nearly
impossible.115 Additionally, many state right-to-farm laws prevent nuisance

106 See A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a Biotech World: Exploring Statutory Grower
Protections, 13 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 206, 215, 230 (2006).
107 McEowen, supra note 67, at 618.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 619.
110 See id. at 620 (noting the risks of countersuits).
111 See id. at 623.
112 See id. at 623–24.
113 Id. at 624.
114 See id.
115 See Friedland, supra note 103, at 428 n.227.
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suits against neighboring farms.116 Nevertheless, contamination of non-GM
crops has formed the basis for nuisance suits against GM growers.117
3. Negligence
To prove negligence, organic programs must establish that a GM producer
or grower breached a duty of care in allowing genetic drift from GM crops.118
There is not a uniform standard for the duty of care owed by GM-crop farmers,
but negligence-based suits have had some success.119 The StarLink litigation,
discussed below, included negligence claims.120 Negligence suits, however,
like most tort causes of action, require injured farmers to prove more than just
economic damage.121 Organic programs have been unable to recover under
negligence for purely economic loss without evidence of physical damage.122
Although organic interests may be able to recover for damages incurred
from gene transmission through trespass or nuisance, the theories provide
after-the-fact remedies to crop contamination at best and do not seem to offer
ex ante deterrence to GM growers. Many organic farmers will be suing their
nonorganic neighbors, who have contracted with GM producers and may not
have the assets to make the injured organic farmer whole.123 Farmers injured
by drift may also have trouble proving damages when their products can still
be labeled organic under domestic standards.124 While negligence suits have
had some success in this arena, they will not be truly valuable until federal law
defines a uniform standard of care.125 Further, adequate federal enforcement of
buffer zones between different crops should prevent tort contamination
claims.126 Organic organizations chose not to rely on ex post tort suits in the

116 Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go
Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 87–88 (2006).
117 Mandel, supra note 95, at 100.
118 See McEowen, supra note 67, at 621.
119 Id. at 622.
120 Id. at 622 n.61.
121 Id. at 622.
122 Thomas P. Redick & A. Bryan Endres, Litigating the Economic Impacts of Biotech Crops, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2008, at 24, 27.
123 See Friedland, supra note 103, at 428.
124 Id. at 429.
125 McEowen, supra note 67, at 622.
126 See Bratspies, supra note 24, at 414; Emily Gersema, USDA Survey Shows Biotech Rules Breaches,
IOWA ST. U. EXTENSION & OUTREACH (Sept. 10, 2003), http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Grain/Topics/
BiotechRulesBreaches.htm.
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cases of Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms127 and Center for Food Safety
v. Vilsack,128 where the organizations challenged deregulation decisions before
incurring damage from genetic drift.129
4. State and Local Efforts at Fostering Coexistence
State and local regulatory efforts at fostering coexistence by controlling
contamination have been largely unsuccessful. No state has passed laws
shifting the loss incurred from contamination away from the injured farmer.130
California, Idaho, and Washington impose legislatively enacted buffer zones
for specific crops.131 Although these enactments penalize those who violate the
buffer zones,132 the boundary distances, like those imposed by APHIS, are not
necessarily effective. While many localities have taken steps to create
“[g]rower[’s] [d]istricts” that prevent the growing of GM crops in certain
areas, state laws tend to preempt the local efforts.133 State laws that preempt
local laws tend to promote the planting of GM crops, rather than foster
coexistence.134 Further, state laws are considerably weakened by state
deference to the federal government’s scientific determinations.135 Finally, the
Plant Protection Act, under which APHIS regulates GM crops, preempts any
inconsistent or excessive state regulations.136 Because of the weakness of state
and local regulations relative to federal regulations, state and local actions are
unable to protect the economic feasibility of organic programs and therefore
are unable to foster the goals of coexistence.
C. The Existing Regulatory Framework
There is no regulatory framework directly aimed at fostering coexistence.
The relevant regulatory framework addressing coexistence lies in the
Coordinated Framework created by the Reagan Administration when

127

130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
734 F. Supp. 2d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
129 Monsanto Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2749; Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
130 Peck, supra note 66 at 64.
131 See Endres, supra note 106, at 215–17.
132 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 52971–52976 (West 2001 & Supp. 2012); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE
r. 02.06.13.200 (2011); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 16-302-055(8) (2012).
133 Endres, supra note 106, at 215.
134 See id. at 219 (noting that many of the state laws that preempt local planting restrictions are
implemented to encourage biotech crops).
135 Id. at 230.
136 Id. at 231.
128
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engineered crops were first conceived.137 The system, chartered to control the
introduction of GM crops, was devised with a pro-industry,138 pro-GM crop
aim.139 The program’s charter emphasized that GM crops are generally
equivalent to non-GM crops.140 This framework is unable to address the
environmental concerns of the introduction of GM crops and has no
mechanism to deal with economic harm incurred by neighboring farms.141
The Coordinated Framework vested power over the introduction of GM
crops in (1) the FDA, (2) the EPA, and (3) the USDA (with the Secretary of
Agriculture delegating authority to APHIS).142 The framework awkwardly
delineated limited power to each agency, almost inevitably leading to an
incomplete system of protection.143 None of the three agencies have a clear
mandate to regulate GM crops.144 This section discusses the Coordinated
Framework by analyzing (1) the responsibility granted to the FDA, (2) the
responsibility granted to the EPA, (3) the responsibility granted to APHIS, (4)
the limitations imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act, and (5) the
failures of the current framework.
1. The Food and Drug Administration
Under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA exerts authority under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) and is charged with
controlling adulterated foods in the United States food supply.145 Adulterated
137

Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,302–09 (June 26,

1986).
138

Peck, supra note 66, at 49.
See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302–06 (noting that
GM crops will not pose new threats to humans or the environment).
140 Peck, supra note 37, at 251.
141 See Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation
of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2243 (2004) (calling the
deregulation process insufficient).
142 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,304; see also
Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297, 311–12 (2002) (outlining the Coordinated Framework and subsequent delegation).
The Coordinated Framework also gave tangential power to the National Institutes of Health and Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at
23,304, 23,306.
143 Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically Engineered Plant Pesticides: Recent Developments in the EPA’s
Regulation of Biotechnology, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 257, 269–84 (1996); Bratspies, supra note 142, at
310–12.
144 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 404.
145 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, ch. 675, § 402, 52 Stat. 1040, 1046–47 (1938) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2006)) (outlining FDA responsibilities).
139
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foods include any food that may contain a “deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health.”146 With power over adulterated foods, the FDA
could assert considerable sway over the introduction of engineered crops.147
The FDA considers GM foods “substantially similar” to conventional foods.148
This equivalence principle allows the FDA to presume that many GM-food
products are “generally regarded as safe.”149 One commentator suggested that
the FDA may have relied on the substantial-equivalence principle as “a
convenient vehicle for avoiding its statutory responsibilities under the
FDCA.”150 Relying on this presumptive safe classification, the FDA has
declined to impose labeling requirements on GM-food products.151 This
decision hampers the ability of the Coordinated Framework to foster
coexistence.152 In an unequal duality, organic foods face strict labeling
requirements in the United States.153 In essence, the presumption today is that
most foods contain GM ingredients. Coexistence principles would be better
served by approval and labeling programs that balance incentives between
organic farming and GM farming.
2. The Environmental Protection Agency
Under the Coordinated Framework, the EPA’s influence over GM crops,
like the FDA’s, is limited. The EPA’s limited influence is due to its narrow
interpretation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

146

21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1).
Bratspies, supra note 24, at 408. The FDA’s power is necessarily limited because it is only able to
regulate products that reach the food (or drug) supply. Bratspies, supra note 142, at 312. However, one would
think that an FDA indication that a food product would not be marketable would dissuade a producer from
planting the crops.
148 Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 442 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from
New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,985 (May 29, 1992)). This policy was challenged by groups and
individuals seeking stronger scrutiny over GM foods by the FDA. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2000). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that
the FDA’s policy choice was not an arbitrary-and-capricious agency decision. Id. at 181.
149 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 McGarity, supra note 148, at 442.
151 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 408. There have been several legislative initiatives since 2000 to extend the
FDA’s oversight of GM crops, but they all died in committee. Id. at 410.
152 See Peck, supra note 37, at 254 (claiming that the FDA policy favors biotech products over the vitality
of non-GM products).
153 See Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXI, § 2107, 104 Stat. 3935,
3938 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6506 (2006)).
147
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(FIFRA).154 This power is confined to controlling the amount of pesticides in
U.S. food products. The EPA interprets the statute as allowing “no regulatory
authority over plants that do not produce pesticides.”155 While many GM crops
produce pesticides and are required to be registered before they can be sold,
the EPA issues permits based on a minimal tolerance level and frequently
grants exemptions to GM producers.156 Under the current regime, the EPA
generally forgoes a meaningful role in protecting organic farms from
contamination.157 The EPA’s permissive approach limits the protection the
Coordinated Framework provides to organic crops and, therefore, frustrates
coexistence goals.
3. The United States Department of Agriculture and the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service
The Coordinated Framework gave authority to the USDA to control the
introduction of GM crops into domestic farms but specifically noted that GM
crops should generally be deemed an improvement.158 The USDA’s authority
is derived from the implementing regulations of the Plant Protection Act,159
which calls for regulation of plants “altered or produced through genetic
engineering that are plant pests.”160 APHIS is an agency within the USDA
charged with executing the USDA’s responsibilities under the Plant Protection
Act.161 Because plant pests are defined as any organism capable of injuring or
causing disease to any other plant, APHIS’s promulgated regulations presume
that genetically engineered plants are regulated as plant pests.162 GM crops are
considered pest risks in part because of their potential to contaminate non-GM
crops through genetic drift.163
154 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,304, 23,306
(June 26, 1986) (directing the EPA to assert regulatory power over GM plants); McGarity, supra note 148, at
466–67 (arguing that the EPA could assert more authority under FIFRA).
155 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 411.
156 Id. at 410–11.
157 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 467, 469–72 (noting the extensive exemptions issued by the EPA
under FIFRA).
158 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,339; see also Bratspies,
supra note 24, at 411–12 (noting that the Coordinated Framework indicated that GM crops will not pose
threats).
159 Pub. L. No. 106-224, tit. IV, 114 Stat. 438 (2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786
(2006)).
160 7 C.F.R. § 340(a)(2) n.1 (2011).
161 Id. §§ 2.80(a)(36), 340.1.
162 See id. §§ 340.0(a)(2), 340.1–.2, 340.6.
163 See Angelo, supra note 143, at 271.
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Modified crops must be cleared by APHIS before they can be planted.164
Pursuant to the Coordinated Framework, APHIS presumes that modified
organisms are not unlike their nonmodified counterparts.165 Indeed, APHIS
considers modified plants “substantially equivalent” to nonmodified plants of
the same variety.166 APHIS has considerable discretion when considering
deregulation because Congress only directs the agency to follow sound
science.167 APHIS may grant a permit when the party seeking deregulation
presents scientific information showing that the GM crop causes no more
environmental harm than the nonmodified variety.168 Typically, APHIS will
authorize a permit for the planting of a new GM crop after field tests
demonstrate that the organism will not pose a pest risk to other plants.169
APHIS does not necessarily fully deregulate a strain and may instead impose
boundary distances between partially deregulated crops and non-GM crops.170
Once permitted for planting or deregulated, a crop is no longer considered a
pest and therefore is no longer subject to APHIS’s oversight.171 However,
APHIS has a duty to monitor partially deregulated crops to ensure that
boundary distances and handling instructions are adhered to.172
4. The National Environmental Policy Act
The Coordinated Framework is supplemented by the restrictions imposed
on all agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).173

164

See 7 C.F.R. § 340.4. Any individual can request deregulated status. Id. § 340.6.
Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412.
166 Id. The substantial-equivalence approach is at odds with the “precautionary regulatory approach,”
which advocates restraint in the face of scientific uncertainty relating to a proposed course of action’s possible
environmental damage. Bratspies, supra note 142, at 317–18.
167 7 U.S.C. § 7711(b) (2006). Producers may petition APHIS for deregulation pursuant to 7 C.F.R.
§ 340.6, and APHIS is entitled to deny the petition, grant the petition, or grant the petition in part. Id.
§ 340.6(d)(3).
168 Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION
SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/submissions.shtml (last modified Feb. 17, 2012).
169 See Angelo, supra note 143, at 271 (describing field-testing procedures).
170 Biotechnology Regulatory Service, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION
SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/brs_main.shtml (last modified Apr. 3, 2012); Permits,
Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168; Regulatory Operations Programs: Compliance and Inspections,
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
biotechnology/compliance_main.shtml (last modified Apr. 11, 2012).
171 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412; Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168.
172 Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168; Regulatory Operations Programs: Compliance
and Inspections, supra note 170.
173 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010)).
165
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NEPA imposes environmental-consideration requirements on agencies
deregulating GM crops.174 NEPA requires all agencies, before taking any
major action, to assess the environmental impacts of the proposed action.175
NEPA charges agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
before any major federal action.176 The EIS must include a detailed account of
the environmental impacts of the action, the adverse environmental impacts
that cannot be avoided, and any possible alternatives to the action.177 An
agency can, however, avoid issuing an EIS if it determines through an
Environmental Assessment (EA) that there will be no significant
environmental impact relating to the agency action.178 Agency determinations
under NEPA are subject to judicial review.179 While APHIS plays a major role
in the deregulation of modified crops (indeed, a more significant role than
either the FDA or the EPA), NEPA remains a check on the environmental
impacts of APHIS actions because APHIS will have to justify a decision on an
action under an EIS or EA before a court.180 Such a justification entails
proving that environmental impacts were sufficiently considered.181
The litigation against APHIS in both Monsanto182 and Center for Food
Safety v. Vilsack183 involved allegations that the agency did not adhere to
NEPA requirements. The decisions show that APHIS has disregarded
significant NEPA requirements when deregulating GM crops.184 Indeed,

174

See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (requiring all agencies, in their decision making, to take certain actions to ensure
that environmental impacts are considered).
175 Id. § 4332(2)(C).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.13 (2011). The inquiry into whether an impact is significant includes
determining the context, intensity, and public health effects of the proposed impact. See id. § 1508.27. But see
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2751 (2010) (noting that APHIS erred in issuing only
an EA and should have issued an EIS before deregulating alfalfa).
179 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243–44 (1946) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th
Cir. 1998).
180 See, e.g., Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751 (confirming that NEPA applies to APHIS actions).
181 See id. (noting that APHIS erred in issuing only an EA when additional environmental impacts should
have been considered).
182 See id. (stating that plaintiffs’ complaint alleged violations of NEPA).
183 See No. C 10-04038 JSW, 2010 WL 3835699, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010) (alleging that APHIS
violated NEPA in its decision to issue permits without conducting any environmental review).
184 See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751 (noting APHIS’s failure to conduct sufficient environmental review
under NEPA); Ctr. for Food Safety, 2010 WL 3835699, at *7 (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to
succeed on the merits that APHIS unlawfully relied on a categorical exclusion to avoid conducting any
environmental review.”).
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despite a court order to consider GM sugar beets regulated pests until an EIS
was completed, APHIS partially deregulated the strain before completing an
EIS.185 The Monsanto and Center for Food Safety cases also demonstrate that
courts are uncertain about the scope of NEPA protections and whether the
environmental impacts that must be considered include economic impacts.186
Further, the lack of significant judicial review after APHIS violated NEPA
(where the courts either vacated an injunction against deregulation or allowed
partial deregulation)187 may not deter APHIS from continuing to forego
sufficient environmental assessments before deregulating modified crops.188
5. Failures in the Current Regulatory System
Gaps in the regulatory structure and incomplete implementation of existing
policies pose substantial problems for the coexistence of organic and GM
crops. The primary failure of the current system is its inability or refusal to
sufficiently consider the impact of genetic drift before approving new GM
crops.189 Although the FDA’s substantial-equivalence approach and the EPA’s
narrow interpretation of FIFRA prevent either agency from playing a role in
fostering coexistence, the primary hurdles for coexistence rest in APHIS’s
deregulation procedures. This subsection discusses (1) APHIS’s failure to
consider the potential contamination of non-GM crops, (2) pre-deregulation
field-testing procedures that only require notification and general scientific
explanations, (3) APHIS’s lack of oversight after deregulation, (4) APHIS’s
current inability to consider the economic effects of contamination on organic
programs, and (5) APHIS’s problems in implementing partial-deregulation
conditions. This subsection concludes with a discussion of the StarLink corn
deregulation as an example of insufficient regulatory oversight.
First, “APHIS does not consider . . . the possible contamination that might
result from pollen drift from GM plants to unmodified plants.”190 By not
considering the potential contamination, APHIS is deregulating GM crops
without considering a primary hurdle to coexistence efforts. Monsanto and
185
186

Pollack, supra note 30.
Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751; Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal.

2010).
187

See infra Part III.
See Pollack, supra note 30 (noting that the USDA chose to deregulate GM sugar beets without
completing an EIS).
189 See Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412 (discussing APHIS’s failure to account for potential
contamination).
190 Id.
188
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Center for Food Safety demonstrate that APHIS may have to revise this
approach.191 To avoid a NEPA violation, APHIS should have to demonstrate
that the environmental impact of genetic drift resulting from deregulation of
the petitioned crop is not sufficiently adverse to warrant maintaining regulated
status. However, after the decisions in both cases, APHIS deregulated the
disputed crops.192 APHIS itself should have substantive requirements to
consider the potential impacts of genetic drift on the economic feasibility of
organic operations. As discussed, protecting the economic feasibility of
organic operations promotes coexistence. APHIS is narrowly construing the
Plant Protection Act when it does not sufficiently consider genetic drift.
Second, APHIS only requires notifications before a GM producer
commences field-testing of a new GM crop.193 The permissive approach may
lead to contamination from crops that have not been addressed by the
regulatory regime.194 While APHIS requires companies to complete a field test
before granting deregulation, the tests need only “evaluate risks wholly by
extrapolating from general, published scientific literature.”195 Producers only
need to submit discussions of scientific literature after loose field-testing.196
Under this approach, APHIS has allowed over ten thousand field tests and has
deregulated over sixty GM crops since 1987.197 APHIS’s permissive testing
procedures increase opportunities for contamination, thereby threatening
organic operations and frustrating coexistence.
Third, APHIS loses oversight capability once crops are fully deregulated,198
and the lack of continuing oversight threatens coexistence aims. As discussed,
excessive monocropping of GM crops can potentially lead to catastrophic
effects.199 Additionally, a deregulated crop may cause more contamination than

191

See infra Part III.
Pollack, supra note 30.
193 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.3(a), 340.3(d)(1) (2011). A GM producer can use the notification system as long as the
new GM crop meets six standard requirements. Id. § 340.3(b); see also Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412–13.
194 In International Center for Technology Assessment v. Johanns, organizations and individuals sued
APHIS for allowing field tests (after only notification) for a GM-grass variety. 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12–13
(D.D.C. 2007). The court held that APHIS had erred in allowing the field tests without first considering the
environmental impacts under NEPA. Id. at 29–30. Because of the weaknesses with NEPA, this holding has not
had a significant impact on testing procedures.
195 Bratspies, supra note 142, at 323.
196 See id.
197 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412–13.
198 Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168.
199 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 124 (citing FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 9, at 47).
192
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expected.200 Once a crop has been partially deregulated, APHIS’s primary
strategy for controlling contamination is through containment measures.201
Unfortunately, containment is rarely successful.202 The failure is either because
planting-distance requirements are not adhered to203 or because the
requirements themselves are insufficient.204 The USDA itself found in 2003
that roughly 20% of farms growing modified crops did not comply with
physical-planting requirements.205 To protect coexistence, APHIS must fulfill
its monitoring responsibility over partially deregulated crops. Additionally,
APHIS should be able to determine, after granting deregulation, that a
modified crop takes too strong a toll on the underlying resources or disrupts
neighboring farming practices too much and thus deserves to return to
regulated status.
Fourth, APHIS does not have an explicit avenue to consider the potential
economic impacts of deregulation. While APHIS must consider the impact of
contamination under NEPA, it does not consider the potential economic harm
to adjacent non-GM farms.206 Without considering economic impacts on nonGM farms resulting from deregulation, APHIS is not ensuring the continued
feasibility of organic farms and is not fostering the goals of coexistence. The
organic farmers in both Monsanto and Center for Food Safety incurred
economic harm but were only successful in suits relating to NEPA
violations.207 Although the Supreme Court, when discussing the standing
challenges in Monsanto, concluded that economic harms do not disqualify a
NEPA claim,208 the district court in Center for Food Safety specifically noted
that it was unclear whether economic harms contribute to NEPA claims.209
Organic programs should not have to resort to nebulous NEPA claims when an
APHIS deregulation has threatened their economic rights.

200

See Bratspies, supra note 17, at 622.
Bratspies, supra note 24, at 414.
202 See Peck, supra note 66, at 43 (noting several potential sources of contamination).
203 Organic farmers are able to sue under regulatory causes of action when GM growers do not comply
with substantive regulatory directives. See Mandel, supra note 95, at 97. This Comment argues that economic
damage to organic farmers caused by GM growers acting within regulatory directives harms the goals of
coexistence.
204 See Peck, supra note 66, at 43 (noting failures in containment measures).
205 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 414.
206 Id. at 412.
207 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2749 (2010); Ctr. for Food Safety v.
Vilsack, No. C 10-04038 JSW, 2010 WL 3835699, at *1, *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010).
208 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2756.
209 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
201
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Finally, APHIS has erred in not satisfying its explicit responsibilities under
the Coordinated Framework. The USDA Office of Inspector General found in
a 2005 audit that the USDA had failed significantly in several responsibilities,
including the “failure to monitor whether GM crops were segregated, failure to
test for contamination during and after field trials, [and] failure to comply with
shipping requirements designed to prevent inadvertent dispersal of unapproved
crops.”210 The report “concluded that APHIS ‘is relinquishing its regulatory
responsibilities in favor of self-certification’ by GM[-crop] purveyors.”211
APHIS’s inability to fulfill its own responsibilities further frustrates the goals
of coexistence.
The StarLink corn litigation highlights the potential repercussions of the
insufficient regulatory system. StarLink corn was developed by Aventis as an
herbicide- and pesticide-resistant strain of corn for use as animal feed.212 After
obtaining nonregulated status from APHIS and registration for nonfood use
from the EPA, Aventis began planting StarLink corn.213 The agencies imposed
a buffer zone between areas where StarLink corn was planted and areas where
nonmodified corn was planted, but the boundaries were ineffective.214 StarLink
corn genes were discovered in a variety of food products, and the FDA recalled
millions of dollars of corn because the StarLink genes had not been cleared for
human consumption.215 StarLink genes were also discovered in exported corn,
and Japan subsequently cut its corn imports from the United States nearly in
half.216 The slash injured the organic interests selling to international markets.
The resulting lawsuits cost Aventis a multimillion-dollar indemnity to sellers
of consumer goods, settlement agreements with the attorneys general of
seventeen states, and the defense of a multidistrict litigation of individual
suits.217 Aventis was subject to millions of dollars in liability despite its
regulatory clearance.218 The StarLink episode demonstrates that the regulatory

210 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 415 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AUDIT
REPORT: ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE CONTROLS OVER ISSUANCE OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED ORGANISM RELEASE PERMITS (2005) [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT], available at http://www.usda.
gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf).
211 Id. at 416–17 (footnote omitted) (quoting AUDIT REPORT, supra note 210, at v–vi).
212 Bratspies, supra note 17, at 593, 598.
213 Id. at 617–18.
214 Id. at 622.
215 Id. at 623.
216 Id. Several other countries, including South Korea and Thailand, also canceled orders. Id.
217 Id. at 627.
218 See id.
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failures at fostering coexistence can also impose substantial costs on GM
producers.
The StarLink corn incident emphasizes the overall weakness of the
regulatory system. The FDA could control the spread of GM crops if it
abandoned its substantial-equivalence principle and seriously considered the
human health effects of modified food products. The EPA considers itself
statutorily constrained to only consider pesticide-producing plants.219 NEPA
forces agencies to consider environmental impacts, but its protection is limited
by its inability to encompass economic harms and courts’ hesitation to provide
sufficient remedies after violations. APHIS’s coverage of GM crops is
similarly constrained by the substantial-equivalence principle. APHIS
oversight is also lacking in that it does not fully appreciate the consequences of
genetic drift, it allows permissive field-testing, it abrogates oversight after full
deregulation, and it does not consider economic consequences of deregulated
GM crops.
The regulatory regime established by the Coordinated Framework was not
designed to protect the interests of organic farming but rather to control and
monitor the introduction of GM crops.220 To protect coexistence, the
Coordinated Framework must ensure the economic feasibility of organic
operations. Ideally, considering recent developments in agricultural research
showing possible deleterious effects of mass GM-crop farming, the USDA and
congressional goals of fostering coexistence, and the growing desire among
American consumers for organically produced products, the regulatory
structure should accommodate coexistence of organic and GM crops.
III. MONSANTO CO. V. GEERTSON SEED FARMS AND CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY
V. VILSACK
Two recent cases demonstrate the current regulatory regime’s failure to
protect the aims of coexistence. This part discusses (1) Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, where the Supreme Court struck down a broad
injunction after APHIS improperly deregulated GM alfalfa,221 and (2) Center
for Food Safety v. Vilsack, where a district court in California restrained itself
219 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 466–67 (arguing that the EPA could assert more authority under
FIFRA).
220 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June 26,
1986).
221 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761–62 (2010).
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from issuing a broad injunction following the premature deregulation of GM
sugar beets.222 These cases display current regulatory weaknesses and the
failure of the courts to protect coexistence.
A. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms began when APHIS granted a
petition to deregulate modified alfalfa, and organizations of organic farmers
brought suit challenging the decision.223 Although the organizations advanced
several theories, the district court determined that APHIS erred in failing to
comply with NEPA procedures.224 Specifically, the court held that APHIS was
required to issue an EIS prior to granting deregulation and that the
determination of no significant impact under a preliminary EA was
insufficient.225 The EA was insufficient in part because APHIS did not
consider the extent of gene transmission from engineered alfalfa to organic
alfalfa.226 The court noted that gene transmission could tarnish the organic
quality of organic crops.227 The district court proceeded to the remedy phase
and allowed Monsanto to intervene.228
The court requested proposals on the appropriate remedy.229 APHIS and
Monsanto submitted a proposed judgment whereby the court would require
APHIS to complete an EIS but continue to allow the planting of GM alfalfa in
specific regions.230 APHIS contended that modified alfalfa could be planted
with several restrictions, including an isolation distance to protect from gene
flow; tailored cleaning, handling, identification, and harvesting practices; and a
requirement that all GM-alfalfa farmers have contracts with Monsanto that
comply with the restrictions.231 The district court declined to adopt the
proposed judgment.232

222

734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2743, 2750.
224 Id. at 2751.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2755; see also Redick & Endres, supra note 122, at 25 (reviewing the
Monsanto litigation before the lower courts).
228 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
223
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The court instead fashioned its own injunction imposing a near blanket ban
on all GM-alfalfa planting.233 In determining the scope of the injunction, the
court noted the technical difficulty in trying to “fine-tune a particular remedy”
and concluded that a simpler remedy is more attractive “from the Court’s point
of view.”234 The court allowed farmers who had already purchased modified
alfalfa seeds to plant their crops until a certain date.235 Later, the court issued a
permanent injunction vacating the deregulation, requiring APHIS to issue an
EIS before deregulating, enjoining all planting until the completion of the
EIS,236 and imposing other handling and identification restrictions.237 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction after APHIS and Monsanto appealed its
scope.238
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the challengers to the
deregulation had been forced to pursue the case as a NEPA violation.239 The
Court held that the organic organizations had standing because they had
demonstrated environmental harm through the NEPA violation and that the
presence of additional economic harm did not remove that standing.240
However, the Court ultimately rejected the injunction because the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief.241 The
Court’s decision rested primarily on the plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate that
they would suffer irreparable injury from the proposed remedy allowing partial
deregulation.242

233

Id.
Id. at 2760 n.6.
235 Id. at 2751.
236 Id. In December 2009, APHIS did complete an EIS and concluded that complete deregulation will not
interfere with organic-alfalfa farmers and that the two “could co-exist peacefully.” See Supreme Court Rules
Ban on Deregulation of Genetically Modified Crops Was Too Broad, 78 U.S.L.W. 1839 (June 22, 2010).
237 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751–52.
238 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
239 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750–51.
240 Id. at 2756.
241 Id. at 2756–59. The four-factor test for obtaining permanent injunctive relief requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate the following:
234

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. at 2756 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
242 Id. at 2759–60.
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This rebuke of the district-court-fashioned injunction demonstrates courts’
difficulties in their efforts to adhere to coexistence goals. The lower court
could not comprehend the technical aspects of the issue. APHIS, Monsanto,
and the organic interests had all submitted evidence supporting or refuting the
appropriateness of allowing partial deregulation.243 The district judge noted the
difficulties in establishing the requisite facts to determine the extent of the
injunction and acknowledged that a blanket ban may be overreaching.244 But
the judge nevertheless imposed a broad injunction.
Based on the language used in Monsanto, district courts will now be very
hesitant to issue broad injunctions when APHIS has failed to consider the
implications of a deregulation decision.245 APHIS ultimately concluded to
deregulate GM alfalfa in January 2011, and organic interests announced their
intention to challenge the deregulation.246 The inability of courts to understand
scientific issues and provide a sufficient remedy, as the district court was
unable to do in Monsanto, illustrates the inability of courts to support
coexistence goals.
B. Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack
Shortly after the Monsanto decision, organic-farming associations and a
Washington organization against biotech products sought vacation of an
APHIS decision deregulating GM sugar beets.247 APHIS had permitted the
planting of GM sugar beets after Monsanto petitioned for deregulation.248 The
organizations brought suit claiming that APHIS erred in failing to conduct an
EIS before allowing deregulation.249 While the district court vacated the
deregulation, it noted that Monsanto counseled against issuing an injunction
and chose to not enjoin planting, at least in part because planting for the season
was already completed.250 The district court also noted, when discussing the

243

Id. at 2758.
See id. at 2760 n.6.
245 See id. at 2760–61 (“[T]he courts have no cause to intervene. Indeed, the broad injunction entered here
essentially pre-empts the very procedure by which the agency could determine, independently of the pending
EIS process for assessing the effects of a complete deregulation, that a limited deregulation would not pose any
appreciable risk of environmental harm.”).
246 Pollack, supra note 29.
247 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 10-04038 JSW, 2010 WL 3835699, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28,
2010).
248 Id. at *1, *6.
249 Id. at *1.
250 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
244
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NEPA violation, that “it is not clear that economic consequences is a factor the
Court may consider in environmental cases.”251 This statement evidences the
need to clarify the regulatory options protecting the economic interests of
organic farm programs.
While the district judge did not fully enjoin the planting of distributed
sugar beets, he emphasized that the vacatur returned GM sugar beets to
regulated status under the Plant Protection Act.252 The decision thus required
APHIS to issue an EIS before deregulating GM sugar beets.253 However, the
USDA announced in February 2011 that it would deregulate sugar beets for the
upcoming season without completing an EIS, which it did not complete until
June 1, 2012.254 APHIS’s choice to defy the court illustrates the weak role that
courts play in fostering coexistence.
These cases demonstrate that APHIS and the courts are unable to protect
the economic interests of organic operations from the potential harms of GM
crops. The cases also demonstrate that organic programs have limited and
incomplete avenues for relief once they have been harmed by APHIS or nearby
GM crops. The limited relief deters farmers from adopting organic practices.
APHIS is unable to foster the goals of coexistence because its deregulation
decisions do not capture the economic interests of organic farmers. Legal and
regulatory reform is required to adequately foster coexistence in the United
States.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
To adequately foster coexistence, the legal and regulatory structures must
be able to control contamination. Possible solutions to the current inability to
control contamination include unilateral agency reform and statutory reform.
The agencies with authority under the Coordinated Framework can change
their policies to enhance protections toward organic-farming interests and,
therefore, coexistence efforts. While the EPA and FDA can implement changes
to advance coexistence efforts, APHIS can effect the most change. APHIS can

251

Id. at 953.
Id. at 955.
253 See id. at 950, 955.
254 Pollack, supra note 30; USDA Announces Final Environmental Impact Statement and Plant Pest Risk
Assessment for Genetically Engineered Sugar Beets, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH
INSPECTION SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/06/sugar_beets.shtml (last visited Aug. 6,
2012).
252
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(1) give more weight to the genetic-drift impact on organic farming when
considering deregulation under the Plant Protection Act, (2) discontinue its
permissive field-testing practices and demand specific scientific evidence
before granting deregulations, and (3) ensure that its boundary impositions are
adhered to. However, limitations on agencies’ abilities to change policies
within their statutory directives may prevent the agencies from fully
accounting for contamination problems. Coexistence will be best served by
statutory reform (1) requiring APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA to abandon or
temper the substantial-equivalence doctrine and consider economic impacts on
organic-farming interests when reviewing deregulation petitions and (2)
granting adjudicatory power to APHIS.255 This Part discusses agency reform
and statutory reform, respectively, as avenues to advance the aims of
coexistence.
A. New Course from Within APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA
Generally, APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA could change their
interpretations of their governing statutes and earn judicial deference for their
interpretation of ambiguous statutes.256 However, there can be limitations on
agencies’ abilities to modify their interpretations of statutes or modify their
practices. When agencies change positions, they must account for reliance
interests.257 Such reliance interests might not be as strong when an agency
reinterprets a statute but may pose difficulties when the agency changes
positions from guidance documents or regular practice.258 Similarly, APHIS,
the EPA, and the FDA will be constrained by their long adherence to the
equivalence principles in the Coordinated Framework.259
255 This proposed solution is offered within the confines of the Coordinated Framework. A more thorough
overhaul of agency responsibility may be more effective. See Mandel, supra note 141, at 2249–50 (proposing,
for regulating GM crops, to scrap the Coordinated Framework’s existing allocations and spread power to
agencies under more direct mandates). This Comment argues that coexistence can be advanced when the
current framework accounts for the economic interests of organic farming.
256 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 863–64 (1984)
(extending controlling weight to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes and noting that agencies can
change such interpretations).
257 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (noting that changes in position
do not require more justification but that more detail may be required when the agency’s “prior policy has
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account”).
258 Compare id. (noting a possible requirement for increased justification of an agency’s change in reliedupon policy), with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting that agencies must have space to change statutory
interpretations under a new administration).
259 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June 26,
1986).
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The nation’s coexistence interests can be protected if APHIS takes steps to
revise its interpretation of the Plant Protection Act. Similarly, if the FDA and
the EPA revise their interpretations of the FDCA and FIFRA, respectively,
then the agencies would be better able to protect the interests of organic
farming and, therefore, the aims of coexistence. This subsection analyzes (1)
changes within the FDA and the EPA, (2) changes in APHIS’s interpretation of
the Plant Protection Act, and (3) policy changes within APHIS relating to the
deregulation of GM crops.
1. EPA and FDA: Interpretive Changes of FIFRA and the FDCA
As discussed, there may be valid reasons for directing the FDA to
reconsider its substantial-equivalence approach to GM-food products. If the
FDA were to abandon the substantial-equivalence principle and begin strictly
assessing the safety of GM products, the resulting changes in approval and
labeling may decrease the demand for GM food and increase the demand for
organic food. The FDA’s statutory mandate does not require it to adhere to the
substantial-equivalence principle.260 While an FDA change may not directly
foster coexistence, limitations on the approval of GM crops may reduce
instances of contamination.
The EPA’s regulatory authority under FIFRA is not directly contrary to the
interests of organic farming. The EPA’s statutory mandate could allow the
EPA to impose stricter standards when permitting GM crops.261 Organic
interests could benefit from a reinterpretation of FIFRA whereby the EPA
revokes its minimum tolerance levels and more strictly reviews GM crops and
their ultimate impact on pesticide levels.262 However, such a reinterpretation is
not necessarily conducive to promoting the goals of coexistence. The agency
that can effect the most significant change toward coexistence is APHIS.
2. APHIS Interpretive Changes of the Plant Protection Act
APHIS could announce its intention to consider new deregulation petitions
on the basis of gene-flow effects on organic crops. The Plant Protection Act
260 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006)) (laying out FDA responsibilities under the FDCA and not mentioning any
required analysis). The FDA’s interpretation withstood an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge. Alliance for BioIntegrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 181 (D.D.C. 2000).
261 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 466–67 (arguing that the EPA could assert more power over GM
crops through FIFRA).
262 See id.
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largely leaves the ability to APHIS to determine what a pest is; it only requires
the agency to obey sound science.263 APHIS could announce its intention to
consider new petitions for deregulation of modified crops as pests under a
standard naming any pest as an organism capable of contamination causing a
certain level of economic harm to farms within a certain distance.264 This
change would force APHIS to consider ongoing marketability of non-GM
crops and potential liabilities for patent infringement. Although this approach
would not allow APHIS to fully consider economic impacts on organic crops,
it would implicitly encompass the economic interests by protecting more
organic crops from genetic drift. If APHIS were able to overcome the
administrative hurdles and begin to reinterpret the Plant Protection Act to
provide more protection to organic crops, coexistence efforts would be better
served. This approach would be difficult because the current statute says
nothing about economic interests and because the approach would entail a
divergence from the long-followed equivalence principles in the Coordinated
Framework.265
3. Policy Changes Within APHIS and the USDA
APHIS could also take less drastic approaches, without reinterpreting the
Plant Protection Act, to better account for the interests of organic operations
and, therefore, coexistence. The agency could change its permissive fieldtesting procedures and begin engaging in environmental studies before
allowing tests that could lead to harmful gene flow.266 International Center for
Technology Assessment v. Johanns suggests that APHIS may soon be required
to conduct assessments before permitting field-testing.267 If APHIS restrains
263
264

See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7702, 7711; 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2011).
The Plant Protection Act states:
[N]o person shall import, enter, export, or move in interstate commerce any plant pest, unless the
importation, entry, exportation, or movement is authorized under general or specific permit and is
in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may issue to prevent the introduction of
plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United States.

7 U.S.C. § 7711(a). Clearly, the congressional grant of power can be considered an express grant providing a
great deal of deference to USDA interpretations. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). The Chevron decision even noted that agencies should be encouraged to change
their interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Id. at 865.
265 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–43 (1983)
(articulating the standard for review of agency decisions pursuant to statutes).
266 Cf. Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412 (explaining that, under the current regime, APHIS typically does
not require permits for field-testing).
267 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 30 (D.D.C. 2007).
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field-testing, organic crops will not be exposed to gene flow from modified
crops before the crops are deregulated. Similarly, APHIS could begin to
require more stringent scientific evidence that potentially deregulated crops
will not harm the environment, as opposed to the general evidence it currently
requires.268 This more stringent standard could prevent the contamination
problems seen in Monsanto.
Finally, the USDA as a whole could upgrade its monitoring of boundary
limitations imposed on GM crops. Even if APHIS takes into account the
interests of organic farmers, if the planters of GM crops do not adhere to the
ensuing boundary limitations,269 organic operations may still lose their harvest
to GM-crop drift. If the USDA is not ensuring compliance with boundary
limitations, GM farmers have no incentive to constrain the planting of
modified crops, and organic farms will continue to be injured. The USDA
could foster coexistence by enforcing existing programs without changing
policy.
There are several limitations in unilateral agency efforts to foster
coexistence. APHIS may not be able to adequately encompass economic
interests in its determinations of what is a plant pest under the current statute.
APHIS may not be able to review existing deregulations without additional
statutory mandates.270 Further, any agency action may be constrained by
existing reliance interests.271 APHIS, the EPA, and the FDA have followed the
Coordinated Framework since 1986. Additionally, agency-initiated change will
not be able to overcome the problem of general courts deciding who gets to
farm.272
Without substantive changes to the underlying statutes, specifically the
Plant Protection Act, the regulatory system is unable to adequately foster the
goals of coexistence. Generally, the possible administrative changes would be

268 See Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412 (noting APHIS’s current practice of allowing general scientific
extrapolations).
269 See id. at 414 (discussing the USDA’s failure to ensure compliance with physical-planting
requirements).
270 See Bratspies, supra note 142, at 325–26 (noting that the USDA does not retain control over
deregulated crops).
271 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (noting that an agency may
require a heightened justification to change a relied-upon policy).
272 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11 (lamenting that the current wealth of
litigation relating to contamination is leading judges to decide who gets to farm).
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helpful to coexistence but not as effective as the implementation of statutory
revisions.
B. Statutory Reform
Congress can revise the governing statutes to force the agencies under the
Coordinated Framework to protect the feasibility of organic crops and,
therefore, foster coexistence. Congress should (1) revise the Plant Protection
Act to change the inquiry undertaken by APHIS when reviewing deregulation
petitions by abandoning the substantial-equivalence principle and considering
economic impacts caused by genetic drift, (2) direct APHIS to retain oversight
after deregulation and monitor scientific developments on the impacts of
deregulated crops, and (3) add a mandatory adjudicative arm to APHIS. The
proposed revisions should also require APHIS to change field-testing and
monitoring procedures, as discussed in the previous section. This section
analyzes the proposed changes and implements them using the facts in
Monsanto. This section also discusses the feasibility and costs of the proposed
revisions.
1. Revising the Plant Protection Act to Account for Economic Impacts
Congress should direct APHIS to abandon the substantial-equivalence
principle and begin exploring the economic impacts of deregulation on
organic-farming programs. Although organic-farming interests and the U.S.
agricultural system as a whole would benefit from changes in labeling and
permitting procedures from the FDA and the EPA,273 Congress does not need
to revamp the FDA or the EPA to protect organic-farming interests
sufficiently. However, revising the Plant Protection Act to impose a
requirement on APHIS to temper the equivalence principle and consider the
economic feasibility of organic crops when considering deregulation will
significantly enhance coexistence efforts.
The necessary revisions should prevent APHIS from continuing to grant
permits permissively for the release of GM crops without fully considering the
economic interests of organic farming.274 The revised statute must include
language requiring APHIS to consider and protect the economic interests of
273 See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 103, at 403–05, 414–16 (discussing the failures in the current labeling
system).
274 Agencies are constrained to follow their statutory directives, to withstand judicial review. See Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–44 (1983).
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organic farming.275 These interests, as discussed, benefit U.S. agriculture
generally and are not necessarily exclusive of GM planting.276 The revision
should maintain the presumption that GM crops should not be introduced until
permitted by APHIS and should further require that deregulation involves a
searching review of contamination and its potential economic impact on
organic crops.277 APHIS’s eventual deregulation decisions will be subject to an
exacting statutory standard protecting organic economic interests.278 Congress
should ensure that statutory revisions prohibit continued permissive fieldtesting, which exposes organic farms to contamination from crops that have
not been adequately analyzed.
While Congress does not need to modify the current organic-labeling
system,279 Congress should ensure that APHIS deregulation procedures
recognize that organic-farming interests may adopt stricter definitions of
organic than the USDA definition. Many organic operations sell to the
European community, which imposes stricter standards than the USDA
promulgates domestically.280 Similarly, many organic organizations require
their own standards in addition to USDA standards.281 Therefore, APHIS
should defer to organic farmers’ reasonable determinations of organic status.
2. Revising the Plant Protection Act to Require Continuing Oversight After
Deregulation
Congress should also modify the Plant Protection Act to include a mandate
for APHIS to monitor technological and scientific developments within the

275 Supreme Court precedent requires agencies to provide a rational explanation for a decision that relates
the found facts to the statutory requirements. Id.
276 See Endres, supra note 62, at 117 (noting the benefits of GM and non-GM crops growing
simultaneously).
277 As discussed in Part II.B, supra, organic farmers cannot necessarily recover for economic loss under
tort-recovery theories. See Redick & Endres, supra note 122, at 27. This Comment argues that sufficient
economic protection can only be attained at the federal regulatory level.
278 The heightened standard, hard look review, requires agencies to provide a rational explanation for a
decision that relates the found facts to the statutory requirements. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–44.
279 See Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXI, 104 Stat. 3935 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523 (2006)) (imposing national standards on the production, handling, and
labeling of organic foods).
280 See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Anticipatory Nuisance and the Prevention of Environmental Harm and
Economic Loss from GMOs in the United States, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 107, 145 (2008) (noting European
organic standards).
281 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010) (discussing organic farmers’
affidavits wherein farmers described steps taken to continue marketing non-GM alfalfa to their consumers).
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GM-crop arena.282 Congress can align this mandate with existing programs
aimed at sustainability and conservation.283 As noted, there are potential risks
associated with extensive monocropping and the repeated planting of GM
crops leading to potentially deleterious effects on overall agricultural health.284
With a focus on monitoring developments, APHIS will be obligated to
recognize new scientific studies that quantify the risks of new and existing GM
crops. While the USDA has been unsuccessful at implementing prior
conservation and sustainability programs,285 a focus on deregulated GM crops’
subsequent environmental impact may make such programs more effective.
Parties should be able to submit data to the agency on scientific developments.
APHIS will be obliged to acknowledge the data, and when data shows that a
deregulated crop exacts too hard a cost on the environment or neighboring
farms, APHIS should return the crop to regulated status.
3. Creating an Adjudicative Arm Within APHIS
Congress should also direct APHIS to create an adjudicatory arm capable
of deciding disputes between GM and non-GM crop farms.286 An adjudicatory
arm will prevent the confused remedies entered by general courts, such as the
injunction issued by the district court in Monsanto.287 Similarly, an
adjudicatory arm could utilize agency expertise and experience in hearing
patent and tort suits, saving parties the cost of educating a general court. An
educated adjudicative arm within APHIS could help promote the coexistence
policies that the USDA advocates for agricultural health.288 The arm will

282 See Mandel, supra note 141, at 2247–48 (noting that APHIS should have the capability of postmarket
monitoring).
283 See David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture: Towards a
Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 37–38 (2002) (noting that
the USDA has not implemented prior sustainability programs).
284 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 124 (“Genetic engineering in the context of commercial crops necessarily
entails decreased genetic diversity. Because it is essential that GE crops have a uniform genetic structure,
genetic engineering encourages monoculture.”).
285 See Adelman & Barton, supra note 283, at 37–38.
286 The Administrative Procedure Act allows agencies to adjudicate disputes relating to an administrative
program. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(a) (2006). Currently, the Plant Protection Act provides federal courts with
jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 7736(a).
287 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2760 n.6 (2010) (quoting the district
court’s decision, which noted both that it was difficult to “fine-tune a particular remedy” and that “the simpler
the remedy, the more attractive it is from the Court’s point of view”).
288 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11 (contending that the USDA wants to
foster coexistence).
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prevent “the courts [from] deciding who gets to farm their way and who will
be prevented from doing so,” as the Secretary of Agriculture fears.289
While ideally statutory reform will reduce contamination, it is unlikely that
such determinations will preclude disputes between GM farms and organic
farms. The adjudicative arm should be vested with power to decide factual
disputes between parties—for instance, whether each party is adhering to
distance requirements imposed by a partial deregulation of GM crops.290 The
adjudicatory arm will also be in an excellent position to hear patent disputes291
stemming from gene flow.292 Disputes involving GM crops are fraught with
scientific and technical information.293 The district court dealing with the
dispute in Monsanto specifically noted its difficulty in discerning the science
involved in genetic-drift disputes,294 and the ensuing broad injunction earned
heavy criticism from the Supreme Court.295 Remedies often involve discerning
adequate boundary distances and outlining handling and shipping
restrictions.296 Therefore, adjudicatory outcomes will benefit from a forum that
is able to draw on accrued agency expertise, a common justification for agency
adjudication.297 Indeed, in both the deregulation and adjudicative arenas,
organic and GM interests will benefit from agency expertise.298 Additionally,
the adjudicative arm can serve as a venue for organic- and modified-crop

289

See id.
The Supreme Court has allowed Congress to vest Article I courts with decision-making power
traditionally left to Article III courts when the decision making is part of and necessary to a broad program,
such as efforts to promote coexistence. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857
(1986) (allowing adjudication as part of the commodity futures trading program and noting that the Court’s
“prior precedents . . . have not intimated that principles of federalism impose limits on Congress’ ability to
delegate adjudicated functions to non-Article III tribunals”).
291 The agency expertise in this area should not be on the validity of patents, traditionally left to the patent
specialty agencies. See Aoki, supra note 9, at 102 (noting the role of specialized patent courts).
292 See Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 24 (noting the wealth of patent infringement cases filed by GM
producers).
293 Some commentators question the current level of scientific expertise possessed by APHIS. See
Mandel, supra note 141, at 2248–49. Such criticisms are beyond the scope of this Comment.
294 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2760 n.6 (2010).
295 See id. at 2758.
296 See, e.g., id. at 2751–52 (noting that the lower court imposed handling requirements for extant GM
alfalfa as part of the injunction).
297 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 915, 935 (1988) (“The first important interest supporting congressional flexibility to employ nonarticle III adjudicators is the interest in making the best use of expertise to implement a substantive regulatory
agenda.”).
298 See Endres, supra note 106, at 233 (noting that technically competent licensing committees could
guide coexistence efforts).
290
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interests to petition for a change in classification pending the discovery of
additional information.299
4. Genetically Modified Alfalfa Under a Revised Regime
The situation in Monsanto is illustrative of the potential efficacy of a
revised statutory scheme in promoting coexistence. The dispute began when
APHIS granted a permit to Monsanto allowing it to plant GM alfalfa.300
Organic programs argued that subsequent GM-alfalfa planting would lead to
contamination causing several organic farms to lose organic status.301 The
organic programs brought suit against APHIS alleging failures in its
determination that the modified alfalfa could be fully deregulated.302 Their
allegations against the agency involved a hodgepodge of inadequacies,
including a violation of NEPA.303 Because the district court adopted the
NEPA-violation angle,304 APHIS’s violation of NEPA was reviewed at the
higher levels, including at the Supreme Court.305 Organic interests struggled to
establish their case, especially in terms of economic harm, because of the lack
of avenues available to protect their economic interests. While a later case
discussed the ambiguity regarding whether NEPA violations should include an
analysis of economic harm,306 organic operations should not need to utilize
roundabout methods to protect their interests. With a more concrete avenue for
protecting organic interests, the dispute in Monsanto would have taken a
different form.
Had a revised Plant Protection Act been in effect during the deregulation
process, APHIS would have been forced to consider the economic impacts of
genetic drift. In Monsanto, the district court specifically noted that APHIS
insufficiently considered the scientific aspects of genetic drift,307 whereas
under the new regime, APHIS would have to consider the scientific genetic
299 Congress should mandate an agency response to such petitions so as to avoid deference to agency
inaction. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (expressing strong deference to an agency’s
determination of whether an action should be taken).
300 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751.
301 Id. at 2754. The organic farmers complained that their crops could not meet their organization’s
definition of organic food, independent of the USDA’s definition. Id. at 2755.
302 Id. at 2750–51.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 2751 (discussing the district court’s determinations).
305 Id. at 2756–57.
306 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“[I]t is not clear that
economic consequences is a factor the Court may consider in environmental cases.”).
307 Monsanto , 130 S. Ct. at 2751.
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drift and its economic impact, and also explain it in a manner sufficient to
withstand strict hard look judicial review.308
It is of course unclear whether a revision would lead to a different outcome
regarding the deregulation of modified alfalfa.309 Organic interests could only
be sure that their economic interests be taken into consideration. Presumably,
any deregulation decision with sufficiently high stakes will face preenforcement review soon after promulgation.310 However, those challenging a
promulgated rule under hard look review have a much more straightforward
opportunity to challenge the promulgated rule than arguing for a NEPA
violation. Under hard look review, APHIS would have to explain its choice in
the face of the statutory mandates; here, assuming deregulation, APHIS would
have to explain how scientific and economic data was considered and why it
chose to deregulate in the face of such information.311 This alone is a much
more pleasing result for the coexistence of organic and GM crops.
Assuming, under the Monsanto facts, that APHIS chose to deregulate
modified alfalfa, organic operations contaminated by genetic drift could bring
a claim, within the proposed APHIS adjudication, against planters of GM
alfalfa. The agency would then be required to broker the dispute and issue the
appropriate remedy. The adjudication would benefit from the accrued expertise
of the agency, which allows it to understand the science involved in the drift
calculations and determine the appropriate remedy (if any) with a precision
unavailable to judges in general courts. The parties can also expect reduced
litigation costs before agency adjudication, which will not require educating
the forum and may utilize streamlined procedures. Similarly, if Monsanto
obtained deregulation of a crop and then suspected farmers of breaching
licensing agreements or infringing patents, it could bring its claims before the
agency tribunal. Additionally, if subsequent research reveals that GM alfalfa is

308 Hard look review requires agencies to provide a rational explanation for a decision that relates the
found facts to the statutory requirements. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
309 APHIS has now fully deregulated alfalfa. Pollack, supra note 29. This determination underscores the
need for additional protection for organic crops outside the environmental context.
310 See JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: STRUCTURING, OPPOSING, AND DEFENDING
FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS § 13:1, at 295 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that challenges to regulations begin
immediately after they are published); see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967)
(allowing pre-enforcement review and paving the way for consistent pre-enforcement review in administrative
rulemaking).
311 Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52. Those challenging the decision will have to identify specific comments
or accepted scientific information that APHIS was aware of but did not adequately address. See id.
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more harmful than was understood at deregulation, non-GM interests could
petition to return the strain to regulated status. Unlike the deregulation of GM
alfalfa under the current regime, the process leading to the potential
deregulation of modified alfalfa under the proposed regime would capture and
consider the economic impacts of contamination and foster coexistence.
The foregoing discussion assumes that APHIS will faithfully fulfill its
responsibilities, but history has shown that APHIS will not always do so.
Unless statutory reform leads to renewed vigor within the agency, the
prospects of successful reform are weak. Most likely, any change will continue
to face agency capture and agency inertia, limiting the impact of the change.
5. The Feasibility and Costs of Statutory Reform
Despite the potential efficacy of a revised statute, the current legislative
environment may not support legislative revisions. The organic-food/modifiedfood debate does not seem to be an issue of national importance during the
economic downturn. Similarly, despite growing international demand for
organic food, its domestic demand is probably not sufficiently high to spur
Congress to action.312 Additionally, the large agricultural companies that
advocate the deregulation of GM crops under the current system have
embedded influence within the federal government.313 Overall, until the
national consensus more heavily favors organic foods, it is unlikely that
Congress will revise the current legal structure.
Legislation protecting diverse farming interests is not without precedent in
the United States. The New Deal Era and subsequent years saw enormous
growth in legislation protecting farming interests. These programs ranged from
guaranteed government loans,314 to crop loss protection,315 to controlling prices

312

See Martin, supra, note 53 (noting the growth of the organic-food market but identifying its small

size).
313 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 476 (discussing the agribusiness industry and “its allies in the [Bush]
Administration and Congress”).
314 Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (restricting production to boost prices during
the New Deal), invalidated by U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see also Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1281–1407 (2006)) (replacing the 1933 Act,
which was held unconstitutional, with a system of price supports).
315 Bankhead–Jones Farm Tenant Act, ch. 517, 50 Stat. 522 (1937) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.) (creating the eventual Farm Security Administration, which ultimately worked to protect
small, impoverished farmers).
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and crop yield.316 The success of these programs was responsible for decades
of security and stability in American farming.317 Given this previous success, it
may not be too radical to hope for an overhaul of the regulatory framework
within the next few congressional sessions.
Both of these potential solutions, the agency-centered changes and the
statutory changes, would impose costs on GM-crop producers. The statutory
reform would also cost taxpayer money. GM producers would be forced to
change development in research plans if APHIS adopts changes in its
deregulation procedures. The companies would need to spend more money on
field-testing procedures to explore contamination more thoroughly, and on
research to justify deregulation, instead of just extrapolating from general
research. The producers may also lose investments on developed products that
would no longer meet APHIS standards. Taxpayers would largely foot the bill
for an expanded adjudicatory arm that would necessarily entail an increase in
staff and other outlays. However, as discussed, the adjudicatory arm would
save money for both organic- and GM-farming interests. Overall, the
additional costs would not outweigh the benefits of successfully fostering
coexistence.
CONCLUSION
The USDA goal for the coexistence of organic and GM crops is
unattainable under the current regulatory system. The Coordinated Framework,
a patchwork of agency responsibility, is unable to control effectively the
introduction of GM crops into U.S. agriculture. This failure leads to
uncontrolled contamination, which injures the interests of both organic
operations and modified-crop producers. Recent cases have drawn attention to
the weaknesses in the current system and have underscored the need for a
solution to the weaknesses.
The USDA and Congress have both stated their desire to foster the
coexistence of GM and organic programs. Recent evidence shows that large-

316 See, e.g., Bankhead–Jones Farm Tenant Act, 50 Stat. 522 (creating the eventual Farm Security
Administration, which provided government loans and crop-loss protection); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48
Stat. at 32 (controlling crop yield and price).
317 See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a
Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 624 (2010) (“[T]he policies in the original
legislation continued to serve as the backbone of U.S. agricultural policy long after the farming crisis of the
Great Depression was averted.”).
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scale planting of GM crops has potential deleterious effects on agricultural
health. Organic farms do not pose the same risks. However, organic crops are
unable to offer some of the benefits associated with GM crops. The agricultural
health of the United States requires beneficial coexistence of GM and organic
crops.
The ideal solution to the current inability to foster coexistence involves
statutory revisions (1) requiring APHIS to consider the economic implications
of genetic drift when deregulating and (2) creating an adjudicative arm within
APHIS. These revisions would ensure the economic feasibility of organic
programs and thus encourage coexistence. However, such a revision may be
unlikely in the current legislative environment. If such a modification is
unfeasible, the USDA, the EPA, or the FDA could change their approaches to
deregulating GM crops to limit the harmful effects of genetic drift. Such
modifications may temper the harmful effects of contamination and enhance
efforts toward coexistence.
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